Alan Peacock Dissenting:The Problem of Devolution by MacQueen, Hector
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alan Peacock Dissenting
Citation for published version:
MacQueen, H 2015, Alan Peacock Dissenting: The Problem of Devolution. in R Perman (ed.), Alan Peacock
Dissenting: Essays on the Life and Work of the Founder of The David Hume Institute. The David Hume
Institute, Edinburgh, pp. 15-21.
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Published In:
Alan Peacock Dissenting
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
  
Alan Peacock dissenting: the problem of devolution  
 
Hector MacQueen 
 
Back in the autumn of 1974, when a fresher in the Law Faculty at Edinburgh 
University, I had to write a short tutorial essay about the Kilbrandon Report on the 
Constitution, published just a year before.  That was probably the first time I came 
across the name of Alan Peacock.  As a member of the Royal Commission that 
produced the report, he, together with Lord Crowther-Hunt, had published as its 
second volume a “Memorandum of Dissent”.  That title scarcely does justice to what 
was actually, as the authors noted, “a largely self-contained alternative report”.1  
Over some 250 pages they set out a scheme of constitutional reform which was not 
limited to Scottish and Welsh devolution, but applied to the whole of the United 
Kingdom.  Indeed the memorandum developed an analysis of the effects of United 
Kingdom membership of the Common Market from 1 January 1973 which, the 
authors thought, would “have a major impact on the working of our main institutions 
of government”.2  In consequence they believed “it makes no sense today to seek to 
move ‘sovereignty’ downwards when in more and more subjects it is actually moving 
upwards – to Brussels”.3  They also anticipated –or were perhaps the first to 
formulate – what came to be known the West Lothian question:4 
 
“We cannot believe it is right or acceptable that the Westminster Parliament 
should be precluded from legislating for Scotland and Wales in a wide range 
of subjects (including education, housing and health) while at the same time, 
about 100 Scottish and Welsh M.P.s at Westminster would have a full share 
in legislating in these same matters for England alone …”5  
 
 The dissentient pair argued for a scheme of devolution across the United 
Kingdom, with England in particular to be sub-divided into five regions that could be 
built from the then existing “outposts” of central government and regional health and 
water authorities.  To the powers of these authorities should be added the powers 
which the Scottish and Welsh Offices already enjoyed in relation to education and 
housing, together with transport, police and fire services.  All the authorities would 
also have planning powers in relation to, not only the traditional town and country 
questions, but also economic and social matters more generally.  Each would have 
an Assembly elected by way of the single transferable vote system of proportional 
representation “so we can be sure that minorities will be fully represented – which is 
                                            
1
 Royal Commission on the Constitution 1969-1973 Volume II Memorandum of Dissent by Lord 
Crowther-Hunt and Professor A T Peacock, October 1973, Cmnd 5460-I, p ix para 3.  
2
 Ibid, p viii para 2(e); and see further Chapter III.  
3
 Ibid, p viii para 2(g)(i). The contrary idea that sovereignty is not ‘monocular’ but can be and is 
frequently shared was a favourite theme of the late Neil MacCormick, formerly a Vice President of the 
David Hume Institute: see his Questioning Sovereignty (1999). 
4
 The phrase ‘West Lothian question’ is apparently to be attributed to Enoch Powell, who used it to 
encapsulate Tam Dalyell’s repeated reference in Parliamentary debates on the Scotland Bill of the 
later 1970s to the problem of why he as MP for West Lothian should be entitled to vote on matters 
affecting Blackburn, Lancashire, when that area’s MP would be unable to vote on matters affecting 
the town of Blackburn in Dalyell’s West Lothian constituency.  See further Dalyell’s autobiography, 
The Importance of Being Awkward (2011) chapter 8.  It is said that the general question was first 
raised by Gladstone during the Irish Home Rule debates in 1886.   
5
 Memorandum of Dissent, p viii para 2(g)(iii).  
  
particularly important in those areas where recent voting patterns suggest one party 
could be in a ‘perpetual’ majority”.6  The Assemblies would have power to make 
“ordinances – which in many respects will be similar to the bye-law making power of 
local authorities”;7 that is, be concerned with good government, general welfare and 
the suppression of nuisances within their area.  While these powers would have to 
be subject to general United Kingdom legislation and policies, the Assemblies and 
authorities “would also recommend to the United Kingdom Government and 
Parliament such additions to, or changes in, existing legislation and general policies 
as appear to be necessary and desirable”.8  The regional governments should have 
some independent revenue raising powers: for example by way of a supplementary 
income tax; a low rate ad valorem retail sales tax additional to nationally levied 
excise duties and VAT; and motor and fuel taxes transferred from central 
government.  Each region’s freedom to determine its own expenditure patterns was 
essential to the scheme, with central government’s role being confined to the control 
of the total amount of spending by the regional governments.  
 
 All this has come strongly back to mind in the discussion of a revised 
constitutional settlement following the Scottish Independence Referendum held on 
18 September 2014.  The Memorandum made other points too which, although not 
so immediately resonant with the post-referendum debate, have certainly had 
echoes in other, but still relatively recent, constitutional discussions in the United 
Kingdom: the possible introduction of proportional representation for elections to the 
House of Commons; reform of the House of Lords to bring in representatives of the 
regional authorities, with a primary function of the second chamber being at least the 
delay of measures unduly limiting regional governments; the introduction of a 
Constitutional Court to adjudicate on the vires of regional government actions;9 and 
public funding of political parties. 
 
 In a separate note Alan laid out the principles informing his dissent: equality of 
political rights for all citizens of the United Kingdom; regional participation in 
government which did not decrease the powers already devolved to Scotland and 
Wales; better allocation of national resources if regions had a measure of fiscal 
independence; and the rights of individuals to make the major decisions affecting 
their lives, with governments in general needing to do much more to make its 
citizens less reliant on its support.  Alongside Lord Crowther-Hunt, he also made the 
important point that the scheme of devolution proposed by the Kilbrandon majority 
“at best would not result in any significant reduction in the burdens on Whitehall and 
Westminster; and, indeed, … is all too likely in our view to increase these burdens 
still further”.10  Experience from 1999 certainly suggests that partial devolution has 
added significantly to the complexity of the business of government in Britain, albeit 
that a not insignificant factor in that complexity is the ignorance in much of both 
                                            
6
 Ibid, p 101 para 249. 
7
 Ibid, p 98 para 242. 
8
 Ibid, p 89 para 219. 
9
 Quite inappropriately it was proposed that this Constitutional Court be a division of the High Court of 
England & Wales: ibid, p 119 para 308. 
10
 Ibid, p viii para 2(g)(iv). 
  
Whitehall and Westminster of what devolution actually entails for them as much as 
for the devolved territories.11  
 
 For the rest of his life Alan maintained opposition to devolution that did not 
embrace the whole of the United Kingdom, and that also failed to consider it as part 
of the totality of government and governance in the country.12  On that basis he 
would surely have been severely critical of the Smith Commission proposals for 
further devolution in Scotland only, especially when it brought into play both tax and 
welfare powers; and he would also, I think, have disliked the quite separate attempt 
by the UK Government to deal with the West Lothian question by some system or 
other of ‘English votes for English laws’ in the Westminster Parliament.13   
 
 There were – and are - however at least two major difficulties with the grand 
over-arching scheme which Alan and Lord Crowther-Hunt proposed in 1973.  The 
first is the popular rejection of regional governments in England apart from the 
London Assembly.  However wrong-headed the bases for such rejection may be, it is 
too widespread and deep-rooted to be simply over-ridden.  But the more significant 
difficulty, at least for present purposes, is that England (which for these purposes 
incorporates Wales), Scotland and Northern Ireland are each long-established 
distinct jurisdictions within the United Kingdom.  In matters of law, the United 
Kingdom is not, and never has been, a unitary state.  While Wales and Welsh law 
were finally subsumed within the jurisdiction of English law through the Laws in 
Wales Acts passed by the English Parliament between 1535 and 1542, the Union 
with Ireland in 1800 continued the laws and courts in existence in Ireland at that time 
subject only to an appeal to the House of Lords as a court.  The Government of 
Ireland Act 1920, by which Northern Ireland was created with a Parliament 
empowered to make laws, provided that “All existing laws, institutions, and 
authorities in Ireland, whether judicial, administrative, or ministerial … shall, except 
as otherwise provided by this Act, continue as if this Act had not passed, but with the 
modifications necessary for adapting them to this Act”.  While Northern Ireland’s 
many vicissitudes since 1920 have led from time to time to the suspension and 
replacement of its legislature, its laws and courts have remained distinct from those 
of other parts of the United Kingdom apart from the final appeal to (now) the United 
Kingdom Supreme Court. 
 
 In the case of Scotland, Article XVIII of the 1707 Anglo-Scottish Union 
agreement provided for the continuation of Scots law after the Union, excepting only 
the “Laws concerning Regulation of Trade, Customs and Excises’, which were to ‘be 
the same in Scotland, from and after the Union as in England”.  Legislative change to 
other Scots laws was allowed under the Article, but in matters of “private right” such 
change had to be for the “evident utility” of the Scottish people.  Only in matters of 
                                            
11
 As a trivial example, I have had to explain to an English MP on a Westminster Parliamentary 
committee that consumer law is not a matter within the legislative competence of the Scottish 
Parliament: see Hansard, 11 February 2014, Consumer Rights Bill Committee, col 21 question 44 
(accessible at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmpublic/consumer/140211/am/140211s01.htm).  
12
 See e.g. The Device of Devolution (Hume Occasional Paper No 50, 1996); ‘The political economy 
of devolution: the British case’, in The Political Economy of Economic Freedom (Edward Elgar, 1997), 
chapter 19; ‘The distraught geometry of asymmetric devolution’ in Calling Scotland to Account: Policy 
Options for Spending and Taxation (Policy Institute, Edinburgh, 2001), 64-67.  
13
 The acronym ‘EVEL’ is awkward for proponents of the cause.  
  
“public right” might the aim be simply to make the law the same throughout the 
United Kingdom.14  Article XIX laid down that the principal Scottish courts, the Court 
of Session and the High Court of Justiciary, should “remain in all time coming” as 
they were then constituted, subject only to such regulations for the better 
administration of justice as the new British Parliament might choose to make. The 
Article also stated that all the other Scottish courts should remain, “but subject to 
Alterations by the Parliament of Great Britain”.  Finally, Scottish cases were not to be 
dealt with in the English courts “in Westminster-hall”.  (This did not cover appeals to 
the House of Lords, which came about after and outside, but not against, the 
conclusion of the 1707 Union.)  There was of course no need for similar provisions to 
protect the English courts or laws from Scottish take-over.  While through the 
following three centuries there has been much amendment and indeed repeal of 
parts of the Act of Union under which the surviving 1707 Articles have statutory force 
today, Articles XVIII and XIX remain untouched; and there have been occasional 
indications from the Scottish courts that in their perspective at least these Articles 
are indeed inviolable.15    
 
 Alan and Lord Crowther-Hunt did not deal with Northern Ireland (although 
they thought their scheme could be extended to include the province16); but I think 
their regional assembles making ordinances having the character of local authority 
bye-laws fall somewhat short of what the people of Scotland and (in the event) 
Northern Ireland can legitimately look for given the legal context with which their 
history has provided them.  The Memorandum did in a sentence cite “the present 
separate criminal law of Scotland” as an example of a matter which might be within 
the policy-making scope of the region’s assembly, being one of the “occasions when 
an Area has special needs or special aspirations which are not catered either 
implicitly or explicitly by United Kingdom legislation or general policies”.17  The other 
example given of such a need or aspiration was the role of the Welsh language in 
Wales.  But these two examples are simply not commensurate in terms of their 
social and political significance.   
 
Further, referring only to criminal law completely bypasses another instance of 
a matter which by definition is not the subject of United Kingdom legislation: civil, or 
private, law in Scotland –  
 
… the body of principles and doctrines which determine personal status and 
relations, which regulate the acquisition and enjoyment of property and its 
transfer between the living or its transmission from the dead, which define and 
control contractual and other obligations, and which provide for the 
enforcement of rights and the remedying of wrongs … matters which 
inevitably touch the lives of all citizens at many points from the cradle to the 
grave … 18 
                                            
14
 For the meanings of public and private right see Hector MacQueen, ‘Public law, private law, and 
national identity’, in Cormac Mac Amlaigh, Claudio Michelon, and Neil Walker (eds), After Public Law 
(Oxford, 2013) 168-198, 177-184.  
15
 MacCormick v Lord Advocate 1953 SC 396 at 412 (Lord President Cooper); Gibson v Lord 
Advocate 1975 SC 136 at 144 (Lord Keith). 
16
 Memorandum of Dissent, p 107 note 1.  
17
 Ibid, p 90 para 220.  
18
 Lord Cooper of Culross, Selected Papers 1922-1954 (1957), 174. 
  
 
It is not the case, as a footnote in the Memorandum of Dissent put it, that the 
authors’ proposed Scottish Assembly and Government would, relative to their 
counterparts elsewhere in the United Kingdom, “have a still wider range of 
administrative functions because of the special nature of Scots law”.19  Scots law is 
not of a special nature; it is simply different from English law in content, and 
administered by different courts deploying their own remedies and procedures.  
Moreover, the differences between Scots and English criminal and private law in 
particular are substantial, and so have legislative rather than merely administrative 
significance.  Hence the pre-devolution practice of having specific Westminster 
legislation on Scots law demarcated with “(Scotland)” in the Act’s titles, or, within 
Acts also applying to England and Wales, specifically Scottish parts or, at the very 
least, “application to Scotland” sections.  Responsibility for such Scottish legislation 
before 1999 lay mainly with the Scottish Office and the Lord Advocate (then the chief 
UK Government Law Officer in Scotland).  But before 1999 there was a serious 
problem in getting time at Westminster to consider, never mind pass, specifically 
Scottish legislation.  It could hardly be argued politically that the best response to this 
problem was to abolish the Scottish legal system altogether (much though some 
Whitehall departments might have liked that).  That would have been of at least 
doubtful legality within the context of the 1707 Union.  Indeed it would also have 
been contrary to the Peacockian principle that existing powers in Scotland and 
Wales should not be decreased.20  On this basis as well as the more prosaic 
grounds of governmental efficiency and the need to ensure that the law in Scotland 
was at least as responsive to social change and need as in other UK jurisdictions, 
the devolved assembly there needed – and needs - to have power to legislate not 
only in criminal but also in many significant areas of civil law without having to 
conform to some as yet unidentified legislative norm set down by Westminster.21   
 
 That once conceded, it also becomes clear that Scottish devolution cannot but 
be different from devolution to regional authorities in England.  It is practically 
unthinkable that such authorities should have the power to legislate in such a way 
that the present unity of English civil and criminal law could be lost or diminished.  
True, in so far as that unity encompassed Wales after 1535, it has begun to lessen 
since the Welsh Assembly gained significant law-making powers under the 
Government of Wales Act 2006.  Lord Hope spoke deliberately of “Welsh law” in a 
Supreme Court case in 2012,22 and the Law Commission of England & Wales too is, 
under its present Welsh chairman, taking seriously its responsibilities to the law-
makers of the Welsh Assembly as well as the Westminster Parliament.23  There is 
also a movement for recognition of Wales as a jurisdiction in the legal sense that 
holds good for England with Wales at present as well as for Scotland and Northern 
                                            
19
 Memorandum of Dissent, p 91 note 1 (emphasis supplied). 
20
 See above, text between notes 9 and 10. 
21
 Local government within Scotland is another example of an important area in which the Scottish 
polity has been quite distinct from its England & Wales counterpart because so it was in 1707, so it 
remained in 1999, and so it continues in 2015.  Like private and criminal law, local government is not 
so much devolved as never reserved. 
22
 Local Government Byelaws (Wales) Bill 2012 (Reference by Attorney General for England and 
Wales) [2012] UKSC 53 para 71.  
23
 See e.g. the publication of its Twelfth Programme of Law Reform in Welsh (Y Ddeuddedfed 
Rhaglen O Ddiwygio’r Gyfraith) as well as English; and see also paras 1.10-1.13, 1.16, 2.9-2.12, 2.20-
2.22 (http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/lc354_twelfth_programme_welsh.pdf).  
  
Ireland.24  At least some historical continuity justifies what seems to be happening 
with Wales: it is unlikely, however, that a legislative devolutionary division of England 
can be achieved by a revival of Wessex, Mercia, and the other ancient kingdoms of 
the Anglo-Saxon era.25 
 
 None of this is intended to assert that there cannot be devolution within 
England because of English law; nor is it intended to deny the possibility of devising 
a scheme of English votes for English laws without creating a devolved English 
Parliament.  My argument is simply that a basically uniform scheme of devolution 
within the United Kingdom along the lines to which Alan Peacock remained 
committed from 1973 on would not and will not work.  This is because the history 
that produced the United Kingdom has also left us with distinct jurisdictions and laws 
within that otherwise united realm.  The dissolution of one or more of these legal 
systems is altogether too high a price to pay for the achievement of a new 
constitutional dispensation.26  Again, that is not to say that moving towards 
harmonisation and, indeed, unification of laws within the Union is a bad thing.  Such 
a process has been going on in the United Kingdom since at least 1707, especially in 
fields of “single market” or commercial law such as intellectual property and 
insurance.  It is ongoing within the European Union, and has also taken place in 
federations such as the United States of America, Canada and Australia.  These 
processes in both the United Kingdom and the European Union are ones in which I 
have been happy, indeed proud, to take part over the last twenty years.27  But they 
are not susceptible to short or even medium term fixes. 
 
 When first I proposed the title “Alan Peacock dissenting” for this piece, I had 
in mind to write, not only about devolution, but also about some of his other battles 
with received wisdom over the years on matters such as climate change, arts and 
heritage funding, sustainable development and welfare.  The depth and insight of his 
take on devolution left me room only to tackle that; and I do not suppose for a 
moment that he would have been persuaded by any of the criticisms I have just 
offered against his position.  Alan relished controversy with those with whom he 
disagreed, the sense of combat in meetings or open floor debates possibly 
heightened by his being sometimes unable to make out what his opponents were 
saying because of the deafness in one ear that resulted from the perforation of an 
eardrum at birth.  The walking stick on which latterly he leaned and which he 
occasionally flourished could give him a somewhat belligerent air on these 
occasions.  If therefore some (especially Presidents of the British Academy and the 
Royal Society of Edinburgh) thought of him as a turbulent priest, for me and many 
                                            
24
 Theodore Huckle, “Wales a jurisdiction? Society of Legal Scholars Centenary Lecture 15 November 
2012”, The Reporter: The Newsletter of the Society of Legal Scholars, no 46, Spring 2013, 5-10. 
25
 It may be worth noting here that the gavelkind of the kingdom of Kent survived until abolished by 
the Administration of Estates Act 1925, section 45(1).  
26
 Compare the asymmetric and ‘rolling’ devolution within Spain, where the Código Civil of 1889 
provides a generally applicable private law but each of the autonomous regions recognised by the 
Constitución espaňola of 1978 that had its own private law at that point may continue to develop and 
codify it.  Catalonia provides an especially noticeable example of this: see Antoni Vaquer, “Spain”, in 
Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, 2
nd
 edn (ed Jan M Smits), 2012. 
27
 In the European context, as a member from 1995 to 2003 of the Commission on European Contract 
Law and, from 1999 to 2008, of the Study Group on a European Civil Code; in the UK context, as a 
Scottish Law Commissioner working on joint projects with the Law Commission of England & Wales 
since 2009.  
  
others to whom I was introduced by Alan over the years, he was quite simply one of 
the finest minds and most generous personalities that we ever encountered.  Any 
debate was always, in what is said to be Hume’s phrase about the pursuit of truth, an 
argument amongst friends.  That is the spirit I want to invoke here.  Alan’s light never 
flickered or faded, and now in memory it remains still and always bright. 
